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Why, contrary to their predecessors, did the Taliban resort to use of suicide 
attacks in the 2000s in Afghanistan? By drawing from terrorist innovation literature and 
Michael Horowitz’s adoption capacity theory—a theory of diffusion of military 
innovation—the author argues that suicide attacks in Afghanistan is better understood as 
an innovation or emulation of a new technique to retaliate in asymmetric warfare when 
insurgents face arms embargo, military pressure, and have direct links to external terrorist 
groups. The findings of my in-depth case study of Afghanistan between 1978 and 2010 
support the proposition and show that it was an arms embargo, coupled with what I call 
military pressure, and a direct link to an external terrorist network that made the Taliban 
resort to the use of suicide attack in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
How could this evil have come to us? … We never had these things before. Not even when 
the Soviets occupied our lands. What are these killers trying to achieve? 
 
an Afghan elder, Ghazni - Afghanistan, 2007.1 
 
Fighting a U.S. armored vehicle or aircraft with an AK-47 is not much different from 
putting on an explosive vest. Either way you'll be killed.  
 
      Mullah Sabir, a senior Taliban commander, 
2007.2 
 
It's not easy being in the Taliban. It's like wearing a jacket of fire. You have to leave your 
family and live with the knowledge that you can be killed at any time. 
 
Bari Khan, a Taliban commander, 2009.3 
 
 
For the last three and a half decades, Afghanistan has been experiencing both externally 
led (1979-89 & 2001-present) and internally fueled civil wars (1978-1979 &1989-2001). 
However, what has been interesting but thus far largely ignored is the different tactics 
used by Afghans in responding to these wars. From the late 1970s to early 1990s, Afghans 
heavily relied on guerilla warfare tactics in their fight against the Soviets and their puppet 
regime in Afghanistan. Once the Afghan Mujahidin took over the central government in 
1992, the ensuing civil war witnessed conventional military tactics among warring Jihadi 
parities. However, after 9/11 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime by a US-led 
international coalition, suicide attack – a previously unknown tactic – has become a 
common phenomenon in Afghanistan. Taliban are increasingly using suicide attack as a 
tool in their fight against the US, NATO and Afghan forces. But why now? 
Afghans did not resort to use of suicide attacks4 in their national uprising against  
                                                        
1 Williams, Brian Glyn, 2008, “Mullah Omar's Missiles: A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in 
Afghanistan,” (Middle East Policy. Vol. 15, No. 4: pp. 26-46), p. 27. 
2 Yousafzai, Sami and Ron Moreau. 2007. “Suicide Offensive.” Newsweek. Vol. 149, Issue 16: pp. 34-36. 
3 Yousafzai, Sami and Ron Moreau. 2009. “The Taliban in their Own Words.” Newsweek. Vol. 154, Issue 
14: pp. 34-44. 
2 
the Soviet invasion and its puppet regime that cost them an estimated 1.24 million lives,5 
4.2 million wounded and maimed,6 and another 5 million refugees,7 even though the 
strategy was quite successful in places like Lebanon and Sri Lanka in the 1980s.8 
Similarly, while suicide attacks were becoming a relatively popular tactic throughout the 
Middle East, and parts of South Asia in the 1990s,9 there was no use of suicide bombings 
among various Afghan factions struggling for political dominance and control between 
1992 and 2001.10 Therefore, the question we need to ask is why, contrary to their 
predecessors, did the Taliban resort to use of suicide attacks in the 2000s in Afghanistan? 
Despite a large literature on suicide bombing and terrorism more generally, 
existing theories11 do not provide a convincing explanation to this question. Meanwhile, 
to the best of my knowledge, the only three pieces that directly or indirectly deal with 
suicide attacks in Afghanistan—UNAMA Report (2007),12 Brain Glyn Williams (2008)  
fieldwork,13 and Seth Jones (2009) book14— are neither systematic nor rigorous.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 “The Afghan Mujahidin rebels never resorted to suicide bombings against the Soviets in the 1980s...” 
Source: Williams, Brian Glyn, 2011, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America's Longest War, (PENN: 
University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 202.  
5 According to Asia Watch an estimated 1.24 million dead, and five million refugees (Asia Watch 1991, 9) 
6 Hilali, A. 2005. US-Pakistan relationship: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Co. 
7 According to Asia Watch an estimated 1.24 million dead, and five million refugees (Asia Watch 1991, 9) 
8 See Pape’s (2005) Dying to Win p.22 for success of suicide bombing campaigns.  
9 See Pape’s (2005) Dying to Win p.22; and Richardson’s (2006) What Terrorist Want p. 113 for spread of 
suicide attacks.  
10 “The Afghan Mujahidin rebels never resorted to suicide bombings against the Soviets in the 1980s, nor 
did the Taliban in the 1990s.” Source: Williams, Brian Glyn, 2011, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to 
America's Longest War, (PENN: University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 202.  
The really first suicide attacks in the history of Afghanistan happened two days prior to 9/11 when two Arab 
terrorists assassinated the legendary leader of Afghan guerrilla warfare and anti-Taliban resistance, Ahmad 
Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001. Source: Coll, Steve. 2004. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of CIA, 
Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10 2001. New York: Penguin Press. 
11 Pape’s occupation theory (2005, Dying to Wing); Bloom’s outbidding thoery (2005, Dying to Kill); 
Moghadam’s diffusion of Al-Qaeda’s Jihadi ideology (2008, The Globalization of Martyrdom) 
12 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Report. 2007. “Suicide Attacks in 
Afghanistan (2001-2007).” Available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%202007SuicideAttacks.pdf 
13 Williams, Brian Glyn. 2008. “Mullah Omar's Missiles: A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in 
Afghanistan.” Middle East Policy. Vol. 15, No. 4: pp. 26-46. 
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While the UNAMA report highlights individual level factors influencing suicide 
bombers, it doesn’t say why the Taliban, as an organization, resorted to the use of suicide 
attacks. On the other hand, while Williams’s fieldwork provides a detailed and valuable 
insight about diffusion of suicide attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan, he does not consider 
other factors and explanations. And finally, Seth Jones’s assertion on the Taliban’s 
reliance on Al-Qaeda, effectiveness of the tactic, and media attention as a motivational 
factor, fail to address what made suicide attacks attractive in the first place. 
Therefore, with the aim of providing an explanation for the Taliban’s resort to the 
use of suicide attacks in the 2000s, this paper is the first systematic assessment of suicide 
attacks in Afghanistan, and a country-specific contribution to existing literature on suicide 
bombings. It should be noted that this paper is not about the resurgence of the Taliban and 
increased insurgency in Afghanistan, but rather an attempt to explain what made the 
Taliban resort and heavily rely on suicide attacks in their retaliatory campaign since the 
fall of their regime in December 2001.  
In so doing, the author argues that arms embargo, coupled with what I call military 
pressure, and direct links to an external terrorist network made the Taliban resort to the 
use of suicide attacks. I would like to point out that what I propose here is not a 
groundbreaking or a general theory of suicide attacks, rather it is an integration of 
diffusion and innovation literature to provide a new framework for explaining suicide 
attacks in Afghanistan. 
My dependent variable is suicide attacks in Afghanistan, which is defined in this 
paper as an act of using one’s body as a weapon to kill or destroy the enemy or the target 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 Jones, Seth G. 2009. “In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan.” New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 
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(e.g., human, building, vehicle).15 Although scholars agree on the content and meaning of 
suicide attack, specifically the death of the perpetrator as a condition, they vary on 
labeling the term. There are at least four terms—‘suicide terrorism,’ ‘suicide mission,’ 
‘suicide bombing,’ ‘suicide attack’—used to refer to the same phenomena of killing the 
enemy by using one’s body as a weapon. Due to controversy surrounding the terms 
suicide terrorism16 and suicide mission,17 I refrain from using them and instead use 
suicide attack18 and suicide bombing19 interchangeably. 20  
My independent variables—arms embargo, military pressure, and diffusion—are 
derived from explicit assertion or implicit assumption of terrorist innovation literature21 
and Michael Horowitz’s (2010) adoption capacity theory, a system level theory of  
                                                        
15 This definition is drawn from and is in line with those offered by Pape (2005, p. 10), Bloom (2005, p. 76), 
Pedahzur (2005, pp. 8-12), and Moghadam (2008, p. 6).  
16 Here I am on board with Assaf Moghadam (2008), who refutes the use of ‘suicide terrorism.’ 
Moghadam (2008) argues that the term is problematic because “no agreed upon definition of suicide 
terrorism is possible as long as the word terrorism itself is subject to various different interpretations” (p. 5). 
Furthermore, by accepting the term suicide terrorism based on a commonly cited definition of terrorism, an 
“attack … aimed at noncombatants” (p. 5), we will intentionally exclude all those incidents of suicide 
bombings that were directed towards “uniformed men and women on active duty” (p. 5). 
17 Here, I am in line with Rober Pape (2005) and Michael Horowitz (2008), for refraining from the use of 
‘suicide mission.’ Pape (2005) argues that “suicide missions are hard to identify reliably since we rarely 
know for certain that an attacker who did not kill himself or herself actually expected to die” (p. 11). Along 
the same line, Horowitz (2008) notes that “the means of destruction in this case [suicide mission], the way 
they perpetrate the attack, is the machinegun they fire, the grenade they throw, or the bomb they drop. They 
know they are probably going to die, but it is not their deaths that cause the mission to succeed. They are 
simply going to die accomplishing their mission. That is very different than a suicide attack where it is 
through your death that your mission, the killing of others or destruction of a target, is accomplished. The 
mission is accomplished through your death.” Source: Horowitz, Michael. 2008. “The History and Future of 
Suicide Terrorism.” Essay based on presentation at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Available at 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.horowitz.suicideterrorism.html 
18 Horowitz, Michael. 2008. “The History and Future of Suicide Terrorism.” Essay based on presentation at 
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Available at http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200808.horowitz.suicide 
terrorism.html 
19 Bloom, Mia M., 2005, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, (New York: Columbia University 
Press), p. 76. 
20 These terms are widely used by Robert Pape (2005, p. 10), Mia Bloom (2005, p. 76), Ami Pedahzur 
(2005, pp. 8-12), and Assaf Moghadam (2008, p. 6). 
21 Rasmussen, Maria J. and Mohammed M. Hafez. 2010.“Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: 
Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive Indicators.” Workshop Report. Defense Threat Reduction Agency - 
US Department of Defense. Available at http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research/2010%200 
19%20Terrorist%20Innovations%20in%20WME.pdf 
Hafez, Mohammed M. and Maria Rasmussen. 2012.“Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, 
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diffusion of military innovation.22  
The first independent variable, arms embargo, is inferred from terrorist innovation 
literature’s emphasis on battlefield obstacle.23 Arms embargo imposed against insurgent 
groups present a challenge that insurgents would try to overcome by looking for 
alternative weaponry and tactics. Arms embargo, for the purpose of this paper, is defined 
as the prevention of “direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer… of arms and related 
materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition … [and] paramilitary equipment” 
to the insurgent groups.24 To operationalize arms embargo, I will look at the presence or 
absence UN imposed arms embargoes against the various Afghan insurgent groups along 
with the presence or absence of third party nation-states supplying weaponry to the 
Mujahidin and/or the Taliban throughout the period under analysis (1978 - 2010).  
My second independent variable, military pressure, is inferred from Horowitz 
(2010) and terrorist innovation literature’s assumptions that “asymmetrical military 
disadvantages”25 and ensuing “constraints in the security environment”26 present a grave 
challenge to the insurgents, which should drive them to innovate and find ‘equalizers.’27 I 
refer to this power disparity that exerts force on the insurgents and limits their operational 
freedom as military pressure. I will define military pressure as governments’ exercise of 
force through their security forces with a clearly stated objective of killing or capturing  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Phase II.” Workshop Report. Naval Post Graduate School – Center on Contemporary Conflict. Available at 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=142894 
22 Horowitz, Michael C. 2010. The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International 
Politics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
23 Hafez and Rasmussen, 2012, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, p. 4; Rasmussen and 
Hafez, 2010, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, p. 9. 
24 UN.org. “ARMS EMBARGO: EXPLANATION OF TERMS.” Available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/EOT%20Arms%20embargo_ENGLISH.pdf 
25 Horowitz, Michael C, 2010, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 179. 
26 Hafez and Rasmussen, 2012, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect, p. 4. 
27 Horowitz, Michael C, 2010, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 179. 
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and targeting insurgents’ infrastructure to eliminate insurgency.  
To operationalize military pressure, I will look at number of factors such as 
number of troops, military operations, killing the enemy, and holding the ground that are 
meant to eliminate the enemy, but are dependent on data availability. However, I would 
like to mention that data for operationalizing these factors is severely restricted to 
military operations conducted between 2002 and 2007, and the number of military 
personnel deployed between 2002 and 2009. Similarly it is impossible to find systematic 
data on the number of insurgents killed each year. This means that any reference to 
military pressure in the 1980s and 1990s is less systematic and more descriptive in 
nature, but nonetheless provides a picture of military pressure prior to 2002.  
 And finally, diffusion, my third independent variable, is derived from Horowitz’s 
proposition about diffusion of military innovation and the importance of external links to 
the non-state actors. Horowitz describes diffusion as “the process by which (1) an 
innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the 
members of a social system.”28 I will use diffusion and link to external groups 
interchangeably throughout this paper. For operationalizing diffusion, I will look at the 
presence or absence of a direct link between the Afghan insurgent groups and external 
terrorist groups or militant organizations. 
My method of analysis is qualitative case study, because neither the nature of this 
study nor the available data was suitable for any type of quantitative analysis. Indeed, one 
of the most difficult aspects of research on suicide bombings is the dearth of data. The 
findings of my in-depth case study support the proposition and show that it was an arms 
                                                        
28 Horowitz, Michael C, 2010, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 19. 
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embargo, coupled with what I call military pressure, and direct links to an external 
terrorist network that made the Taliban resort to the use of suicide attacks.  
 The paper is organized in the following manner. First, I go through the current body 
of suicide bombing literature to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. The next section 
is the theory and method. Here I present Michael Horowitz’s adoption capacity theory 
along with terrorist innovation literature to provide theoretical background for hypothesis. 
This will be followed by a brief overview of methodology. Section four presents the 
empirical findings and analysis. The last section concludes the paper. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Suicidal attacks are centuries old phenomena and weapons of choice that human beings 
have used across times, cultures, and religions for particular purposes. In the earliest 
instances of suicide attacks, the perpetrators (e.g., Jewish Zealots - 4 BC-70 AD; 
Ismaillis-Nazari - 1090-1256) used conventional military tools of the time (e.g., swords, 
firearms) to kill the target(s) without caring for their own safety and lives.29 Due to the 
intention of the perpetrators, scholars regard those early instances as suicide attacks.30 
There is a whole body of descriptive literature that deals with the historical manifestations 
of suicide attacks.31 
                                                        
29 Bloom, Mia M. 2005. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia 
University Press; Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New 
York: Random House.; Moghadam, Assaf. 2008. The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, 
and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimor: the Johns Hopkins University Press; Hassan, Riaz. 2011. 
Suicide Bombings. Routledge. 
30 Bloom, Mia M. 2005. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia 
University Press; Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New 
York: Random House.; Moghadam, Assaf. 2008. The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, 
and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks. Baltimor: the Johns Hopkins University Press; Hassan, Riaz. 2011. 
Suicide Bombings. Routledge. 
31 Moghadam, 2008, The Globalization of Martyrdom; Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill; Pape, 2005, Dying to 
Win; Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings; Dale, Stephen Fredrick. 1988. “Religious Suicide in Islamic Asia: 
Anticolonial Terrorism in India, Indonesia and the Philippines.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 32, No 
1: pp. 37-59; Richardson, Louise. 2006. What Terrorist Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the 
8 
Modern day (post-1980) suicide attacks, in general, and the events of 9/11 in 
particular, have led scholars to vigorously study and hypothesize the root causes of this 
phenomena. Some scholars have looked at isolated individual or societal level factors 
such as psychopathology, religion, or poverty; whereas, recent scholarly findings 
emphasize at broader approach, integrating individual and societal with organizational 
level factors.32 Thus, I will explore suicide attack literature and its main theories around 
the framework of “three levels of analysis.”33  
A. Individual Level Theories 
Individual level explanations “have attempted to explain this phenomenon as the result of 
brainwashing, extreme poverty, emotional dysfunction, or feelings of despair.”34  
 One of the early theories of suicide bombing at the individual level attributed it to 
psychological factors. Some scholars argue that psychological factors such as 
powerlessness, humiliation, and hopelessness combined with sense of power that comes 
from deciding about ones own and others lives and deaths, make individuals carry out 
suicide bombing.35 Furthermore, according to Riaz Hassan (2011), psychological theorists 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Threat. New York: Random House; Reuter, Christoph. 2004. My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of 
Suicide Bombing. Princeton University Press; Dzikansky, Mordecai, Gil Kleiman, and Robert Slater. 2012. 
Terrorists Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press; 
Winkates, J. 2006. “Suicide terrorism: martyrdom for organizational objectives.” Journal of Third World 
Studies. Vol. 23, No.1: pp.87-110. 
32 Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings; Hassan, Riaz. 2010. Life as a Weapon: The Global Rise of Suicide 
Bombings. Routledge; Hassan, Riaz. 2009. “What Motivates the Suicide Bombers? Study of a 
comprehensive database gives a surprising answer.” Available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/what-
motivates-suicide-bombers-0; Gill, Paul. 2007. “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing.” 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV). Vol. 1, No. 2: pp. 142–159; Hafez, Mohammed M. 
2006b. “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical 
Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol. 29, Issue 2: pp. 165-185; 
Moghadam, Assaf. 2005. “The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach.” Working draft 
Presented in Harrington Workshop on the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism. University of Texas at Austin. 
Available at http://tamilnation.co/terrorism/sri_lanka/moghadam.pdf. 
33 Hafez, 2006b, “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers,” p. 165. 
34 Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill. p. 1. 
35 Speckhard, Anne. 2008. “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 
Vol. 31, Issue 11: pp. 1023–1051; Speckhard, Anne and Khapta Akhmedova. 2008. “Black Widows and 
9 
label terrorists as “mad and bad men and women … [who] suffer from various forms of 
mental deficiency and personal disorder.”36 Meanwhile, such individuals are 
demographically characterized as “uneducated, unemployed, socially isolated, single men 
in their late teens and early twenties.”37 
 However, these studies have failed in producing tangible results38 and “cannot 
explain why suicide terrorism occurs only in certain societies and at certain point [and] 
why over 95 percent of all suicide terrorist attacks occur in organized campaign that are 
concentrated in time.”39 Meanwhile, there is an inconsistency between “demographic 
profile” of “suicidal individuals” and suicide bombers. Contrary to psychological 
theorists’ demographic framing of suicide bombers, Pape (2005) found that suicide 
bombers’ “lifestyle” greatly vary, meaning “they have been college educated and 
uneducated, married and single, men and women, isolated and socially integrated; they 
have ranged in age from fifteen to fifty-two.”40   
Poverty is deemed as another potential factor affecting both individual and broader 
society in harboring terrorism. It had a strong appeal among academia and echoed among 
policy circles, which is evident from the speech of George W. Bush, then President of the 
United States: “We fight poverty because hope is the answer to terror. … We will 
challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that 
too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize.”41 However, a growing body of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
beyond: Understanding the motivations and life trajectories of Chechen female terrorists.” In Female 
Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, Utility, and Organization, edited by Cindy D. Ness. New York: 
Routledge. Pp. 100–121. 
36 Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings. p. 36. 
37 Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 17. 
38 Hassan, 2011, Suicide Bombings. 
39 Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 17. 
40 Ibid., p. 17. 
41 As qtd. in Scott Atran, 2003, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” para. 18. Available at 
10 
literature questions the argument linking suicide bombings to poverty at the individual 
level.42  
But some still argue that its ‘indirect effects’ in broader socio-political context 
cannot be disregarded.43 Economically poor countries with weak state apparatus not only 
provide fertile operational ground for terrorist organizations and networks, but also enable 
these groups to exploit citizens’ perceived notion of relative deprivation in recruiting 
them.44 This argument, however, is also refuted with quantitative empirical findings. 
Robert Pape (2005) illustrates that “the countries plagued by suicide terrorism from 1980 
to 2001 are by no means the worst off in the world … [and meanwhile,] the most 
economically hopeless states in the world … [did not experience] a single suicide terrorist 
attack during this period.”45 
Meanwhile some argue that “Suicide attackers do not usually claim to act out of 
despair, or for personal, fatalistic reasons. Instead, they usually claim to act as martyrs for 
altruistic reasons—that is, for the sake of their larger community, their country, or 
religion.”46 This postulation is referred to as altruistic reasons for suicide bombing. For 
Barbara Victor (2003), the main factors influencing individuals’ participation in suicide 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/299/5612/1534.full#ref-21 
42 Haddad, S. 2004. “A comparative study of Lebanese and Palestine perceptions of suicide bombing: the 
role of militant Islam and socioeconomic status.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology. Vol. 45: 
pp. 337-363; Berrebi, Claude. 2007. “Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism 
among Palestinians.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. Vol. 13, Issue 1, Art. 2; Krueger, 
Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. 2004. "Education, Poverty And Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?" 
Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 17, Issue. 4: pp. 119-144; Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. 
2002. “The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers.” New Republic Issue 24: pp. 27-34; Bergen, 
Peter and Swati Pandey. 2006. “The Madrasa Scapegoat,” The Washington Quarterly Vol. 29, Issue 2: pp. 
117–125. 
43 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Report. 2007. “Suicide  
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bombings are personal vengeance and retaliation to losses in the family or close 
associates, and peer pressure. Meanwhile others argue that altruistic reasons such as 
feeling of responsibility towards member of the community compel individuals to conduct 
suicide attacks.47 Adding to that Ami Pedahzur (2005) argues that sense of responsibility 
and dedication to an even greater cause, especially an ideological one, motivates some of 
the suicide bombers to sacrifice themselves.   
To sum up, factors that influence individuals to participate in suicide bombings are 
complex and beyond dying to inflict damage; rather these factors have: 
… a broader significance for achieving multiple purposes – from personal to communal. 
These include gaining community approval and political success; liberating the homeland; 
achieving personal redemption or honor; using martyrdom to effect the survival of the 
community; refusing to accept subjugation; seeking revenge for personal and collective 
humiliation; conveying religious or nationalistic convictions; expressing guilt, shame, 
material and religious rewards; escaping from intolerable everyday degradations of life 
under occupation, boredom, anxiety and defiance.48  
 
As Mia Bloom (2005) points out, “the individual bombers might be inspired by several—
sometimes complementary—motives,”49 however this paper is particularly interested in 
understanding what makes organizations, in our case the Taliban, to resort to the use of 
suicide attacks. Therefore, with an eye on individual level factors, this paper mainly 
concentrates on organizational causes and motives. However, prior to evaluating 
organizational theories of suicide attack, I would like to go through the societal level 
explanations of suicide attacks. 
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B. Societal Level Theories 
It has been claimed that the broader environment (e.g., culture, history, religion, 
politics…) lays out the rules and norms for acceptable and unacceptable deeds, and at 
times, provides pathways for conducting such notorious acts that were previously 
regarded as unacceptable.50  
 Some scholars perceive religion, especially Islam, as the main factor influencing 
suicide bombers.51 Sam Harris (2004) argues that there is ample undisputed evidence that 
Islamic doctrine, the Quran, encourages terrorism, and as such, rather than being 
manipulated, the religion of Islam is the source of violence.52 However, a growing body of 
scholarly findings refute such notions,53 arguing that religion is neither “necessary” nor 
“sufficient cause” for suicide bombings.54 Pape (2005) argues that “Religion is rarely the 
root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist organizations in recruiting and in 
other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective.”55 Along the same line, Bloom 
(2005) asserts that “even the most religious organization that employs suicide terror is 
pragmatic and power seeking. Their political survival is ultimately more important than 
any ideology.”56  
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53 Hafez, Mohammad M. 2006a. Manufacturing Human Bombs: The making of Palestinian suicide bombers. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press; Hafez, Mohammed M. 2006b. “Rationality, 
Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and 
Illustrative Case Study.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Vol. 29, Issue 2: pp. 165-185; Pedahzur, 2005, 
Suicide Terrorism; Pape, 2005, Dying to Win; Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill; Reuter, 2004, My Life Is a 
Weapon; Victor, Barbara. 2003. Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers. 
Rodale: Distributed to the book trade by St. Martin's Press. 
54 Crenshaw, Martha, 2007, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay,” (Security Studies. Vol. 16, 
No.1: pp.133-162), p.149. 
55 Pape, 2005, Dying to Win, p. 4. 
56 Bloom, 2005, Dying to Kill, p. 89. 
13 
 Meanwhile, historical antecedents of suicide attacks (e.g., Jewish Zealots,57 
Japanese kamikaze58) and its modern manifestations (e.g., Sri Lankan Hindu Tamil 
Tigers59 and secular Vietnamese Viet Cong units60) demonstrate that Muslims were not 
the sole perpetrators of suicide attack. According to Assaf Moghadam (2008), the Muslim 
groups initially had difficulty justifying suicide attacks because Islam does not allow 
suicide (my emphasis).61 Overall, the evidence suggests that religion (e.g., Islam) is not 
the cause or reason behind suicide attacks, but rather used as a tool by the insurgent 
organizations in pursuit of their objectives. 
 Besides religion, domestic support for suicide campaign is perceived to be a 
crucial societal factor in sustaining the campaign. Local support tends to be high in places 
where suicide bombing is perceived as “a legitimate military tactic” against specific 
targets (e.g., security forces, political elites) or in cases where “the hatred for others is 
very high.”62 Otherwise, if used indiscriminately against civilian population, the tactic 
“will fail to win over the hearts and minds of the public … [and] will only deepen the gap 
between the insurgents and the masses.”63  
Adversaries’ harsh counter-terror tactics and strategies are major factors in 
influencing domestic support for suicide attacks. According to Mohammad Hafez 
(2006b), prior to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (second Palestinian uprising, Sept 
2000 - Feb 2005), two-thirds of Palestinians were against indiscriminate suicide bombings 
– specifically targeting Israeli civilians. However, “Israel’s heavy handed tactics, of 
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targeted assassination, preemptive attacks to root out the terrorists, and destruction of their 
infrastructure” dramatically altered Palestinians’ perception about the use of suicide 
attacks against Israeli population.64 As a result public support for indiscriminate use of 
suicide bombings increased from one-third-approval rating of the Oslo peace years (1993-
2000) to two-thirds during Intifada, only to reach its peak (74.5%) in October 2003.65 
With the increase of approval ratings among the Palestinian population for suicide attacks, 
the number of suicide attacks increased from 28 attacks of the Oslo peace era (1993-2000) 
to “110 suicide attacks” in the subsequent three years of post-Oslo peace, which means 
the average suicide attacks per year increased from 4 to 36.66  
Meanwhile, use of advanced military capabilities (aerial power) against insurgent 
groups often causes civilian casualties, which increases the propensity of domestic 
support for the insurgent groups and increases the pool of their recruitment for suicide 
attacks. 
The evidence presented above shows that domestic support is crucial for sustaining 
suicide attacks, but it is not the initial cause of suicide attacks. Although Hafez (2006a) 
claims that some militant organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in 1994, and Al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 2000, adopted 
suicide bombings due to extreme pressure from society suffering under occupation, the 
triggering effects were something else. In the case of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, “the 
Israeli decision to deport 415 Palestinian militants to Lebanon in 1992 had disastrous 
unintended consequences as the Palestinians learned the value of the tactic from 
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Hezbollah.”67 Whereas, the latter groups – Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine – adopted suicide attacks due to competition among various 
rebel organizations for popularity and local support.68 Therefore, rather than extreme 
societal pressure, diffusion and intergroup rivalry were the reasons behind the Palestinians 
groups resort to the use of suicide attacks.  
One might ask that given the Taliban’s low level of domestic support (less than 
10%),69 how did the Taliban manage to sustain their suicide attack campaign. There are 
two explanations for this trend. The first one, although contested, is the availability of 
foreigners ready to blow themselves up for the cause of the Taliban.70 The second 
explanation is the presence of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan71 along with Pakistani 
madrasas (religious school) that provide fertile ground for the Taliban’s recruitment.72 
Meanwhile, causalities caused by the use of coalition aerial bombings and drone strikes 
also increases the pool of the Taliban’s recruits. According to Pakistani Television 
Network’s chief news correspondent, Mushtaz Mihans, “whenever a village or houses are 
bombed in tribal areas, it creates more suicide bombers. It’s not just because they have 
been lured by a cleric with a promise of heaven, it’s also because of the Pashtun badal 
tradition [which means revenge at any cost].”73  
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 After assessing the individual level theories and societal level postulations, which 
were unable to provide convincing explanations for Taliban’s resort to the use of suicide 
attacks, the paper turns to organizational theories of suicide attacks for possible 
explanations. 
C. Organization Level Theories 
Scholars studying suicide attacks at the organizational level highlight that organizations 
employ suicide bombing due to its materialistic dimension and incentives.74 According to 
these scholars, suicide bombing is an effective strategy for organizations fighting a 
technologically advanced and superior adversary for various reasons. First, it inflicts 
comparably more physical and material damage than any other sort of assault. Second, 
with such great efficacy, suicide bombing requires minimal resources in terms of 
equipment, training and manpower.75 Third, it not only affects perception and sentiment 
of democratic citizens towards the war, which is crucial for changing the attitude of their 
political representatives to withdraw their troops, but also delegitimizes the local 
governments by creating instability and sense of chaos among ordinary citizens.76 
However, adopting suicide bombing is not an easy task for organizations. Prior to 
endorsing suicide bombings, organizations go through cost-benefit analysis and evaluate 
opportunities and risks associated with such strategy. Pedahzur (2005) argues that 
organizations willing to endorse suicide bombing go through three stages prior to making 
any final decision. In the first stage, decision makers rationally calculate the choice of 
pursuing suicide bombing with the probable consequences of losing domestic support. 
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Next comes the issue of recruiting ideologically motivated individuals. The third and final 
stage involves training and mentally preparing the suicide bombers. This involves 
isolating individuals from the rest of the community, and the process is continued until 
they are totally brainwashed.77 
These scholars, however, differ on their account of what motivates insurgent 
groups to resort to the use of suicide attacks. For Moghadam (2008), the spread and 
dramatic increase of recent suicide attacks are indebted to Al-Qaeda’s “Salafi-Jihadist 
ideology.”78 Meanwhile, rather than blaming “religious fanaticism,” Pape (2005) regards 
nationalism and home land liberation as a driving force behind individuals’ and 
organizations’ motivation to use suicide attacks in their fights against occupying forces. 
And finally, Bloom (2005) argues that competition among various rebel organizations for 
dominance and local support, make these groups to endorse suicide bombing. These 
postulations have led to three main organizational theories of suicide bombing.  
1. Counter-Occupation Strategy  
One of the prominent theories of suicide attacks blames occupation for endorsement and 
rise of suicide attacks.79 Orchestrated by Robert Pape (2005), the theory counters 
conventional wisdom that linked suicide attacks to Islam, poverty or psychopathological 
factors, and instead regards suicide bombing as a strategic tool used by groups pursuing 
nationalistic goals and objectives. His empirical analysis of more than three hundred 
incidents of suicide attacks over a period of more than two decades (1980 - 2003) supports 
his theoretical postulation that a “secular and strategic goal” such as nationalism and 
emancipation of homeland from foreign invaders or occupiers, is the driving force behind 
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suicide bombings.80 As such, suicide bombing is used as a “strategy of coercion” to make 
the occupier, mainly democratic countries, rethink their policy of occupation.81  
 However, according to Moghadam (2008), there are some flaws in Pape’s theory 
of nationalism and emancipation of homeland from invaders. First of all, the rising 
number of suicide attacks occur in countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, 
Morocco, UK, US, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Uzbekistan that are not under any 
“discernible occupation.”82 Second, Moghadam argues that most of the attacks in Iraq are 
not directed towards the occupiers, who should be the target according Pape; rather the 
victims are various Iraqi ethnicities. Third, he notes that even in the case of attacks against 
foreign invaders in Iraq, the perpetrators are foreign nationals (Saudis, Kuwaitis, Syrians 
and other North African Jihadis) rather than Iraqis, who according to Pape’s theory should 
conduct such acts because they are victims of occupation. Meanwhile, according to 
Michael Horowitz (2008): 
… while occupation can explain some cases of suicide bombing, it cannot explain non-
adoption by prominent groups… Consider the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
in Northern Ireland, a violent terrorist group whose members had no problem dying for 
the cause but which never adopted suicide terrorism (on a few occasions they kidnapped 
families and forced the husband to drive a bomb loaded with explosives towards a 
checkpoint, but those are coercive rather than voluntary).83 
 
The counter-arguments show that although an important contribution, Pape’s occupation 
theory does not explain most cases of suicide attacks. Occupation is definitely not the 
reason behind post-9/11 suicide attacks in Afghanistan for two main reasons: first, 
Afghans perception of foreign troops presence; and second, their hatred for the Taliban. 
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Rather than viewing the US and NATO-led coalition troops as invaders, Afghans warm-
heartedly welcome and want international forces to remain in Afghanistan until the 
Afghan forces can provide Afghans with security. A UNDP and Afghan Interior 
Ministry’s survey shows that two-thirds (68%) of Afghans support the presence of foreign 
troops in Afghanistan.84  
 Meanwhile, other surveys conducted over the past years (2005-2010) show people’s 
support for the current government and distaste for the Taliban.85 In response to a survey 
question, “Who Would You Rather Have Ruling Afghanistan Today,” asked repeatedly 
over the years (2005-2010), a majority of the Afghans (80 to 90%) preferred the current 
government to the Taliban (less than 10% support).86  
2. ‘Outbidding’ Theory 
Another organizational theory of suicide bombing is Mia Bloom’s (2005) ‘outbidding’ 
hypothesis. While not totally disregarding the impact of occupation, Bloom argues that 
competition among various rebel organizations for dominance and local support, 
especially, when other tactics fail in enhancing the groups’ prestige and reputation, make 
the militant organizations to endorse suicide bombing. Therefore, rather than religious 
ideology, ‘pragmatic and power seeking’ attitudes along with ‘political survival’ are the 
reason behind militant groups resort to the use of suicide attacks.87  
Bloom’s theory is also not immune from shortcomings and criticisms. Horowitz 
(2008) notes that the main problem of ‘outbidding’ theory is that “it does not explain 
suicide campaigns where there are not elite competitions for control. For example, in the 
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Tamil case, the struggle for influence among Tamil resistance groups was over before the 
Tamil Tigers’ suicide terror campaign began.”88  
Similarly in Afghanistan, competition for domestic support and dominance among 
various Mujahidin groups in the 1980s and 1990s did not result in the use of suicide 
attack. On the other hand, lack of competition among current insurgent groups (the 
Taliban, Haqani network, Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, Al-Qaeda and Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan) that are fighting the U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces, resulted in the use of 
suicide attacks. Furthermore, Moghadam (2008) argues that the theory is incompatible 
with the nature and goals of transnational groups such as Al-Qaeda that are vying for 
transnational rather than domestic support. All these hint that while ‘outbidding’ theory 
can explain certain cases (Palestinian factions), it fails to provide explanation for other 
ones, especially, the Taliban. 
3. Diffusion of Al-Qaeda’s ‘Salafi-Jihadist Ideology’ 
Contrary to Pape’s occupation and Bloom’s outbidding theories, Assaf Moghadam (2008) 
blames Al-Qaeda’s “Salafi-Jihadist ideology” for the rise and spread of suicide attacks 
among militant organizations.89 According to Moghadam, three factors contributed to the 
expansion of Al Qaeda’s operations. The first was “the core doctrine of Al Qaeda” which 
is based on assumption that the group would act “as a vanguard of a new global Islamic 
insurgency devoted to the defense of the umma [Muslim community] wherever its well-
being would be imperiled … [and] fight and defeat infidel and apostate countries the 
world over.”90 The second reason was the return of Arab fighters to their respective 
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countries after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which diffused Al-Qaeda mentality. 
And finally, the strategic shift in the organizations’ modus operandi after 1995; rather 
than fighting their Arab puppet regimes, Al Qaeda decided to target the west, especially 
the United States.91 
 However, there are some problems in Moghadam’s overwhelming emphasis on Al-
Qaeda and its Salafi-Jihadist ideology in promoting and prompting the global rise of 
suicide attacks. “The idea of suicide terrorism traveled from Iran to Lebanon, but from 
Lebanon it spread a long way... the skill set was transferred from Shiite (Iran and 
Hezbollah) to Sunni (Hamas and later al-Qaeda) Muslims, as well as to secular Palestinian 
and [non-Muslim, secular Hindu,] Tamil Groups.”92 Thus, rather than Sunni Al-Qaeda, 
the Shiite Muslims, Iranians and Hezbollah of Lebanon, were the pioneering forces in 
justifying and promoting the use of suicide attacks among Muslims. Furthermore, Hamas 
was the first Muslim Sunni group that adopted the use of suicide attacks from Shiite 
Hezbollah and as such provided a legitimate foundation for future Sunni Muslims groups, 
including Al-Qaeda 
 Similarly, Moghadam’s method of blending and labeling some groups as Salafi-
Jihadist or overwhelmingly influenced by them is problematic. Contrary to his portrayal 
of the Taliban as Salafi-minded, they are followers of the Hanafi Deobandy School, which 
is different from Salafism – a distinction that even Moghadam acknowledges.93 The 
Taliban follows an established and well-defined school (Hanafi Deobandy School), 
whereas Salafis (to which Al-Qaeda adhere) do not constrain themselves with any of the 
four Sunni jurisprudence schools of thought (Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafie, Maliki). Rather they 
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have the freedom to follow any one of them in a given matter based on authenticity of 
their sources, which in some cases make manipulation of religious texts easier.  
 Furthermore and most importantly, while Al-Qaeda has a global aim and 
intention— defending the Muslim Umma, waging global Jihad, installing the Caliphate;94 
the Taliban’s objective are clearly domestic—regaining power in Afghanistan, and that is 
all.95 The Taliban and Al-Qaeda were and are allies, but that is different from sharing the 
same worldview.96 Therefore, to say that the Taliban were mainly influenced by Al-
Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology, and branding them as Salafi Jihadist is counterintuitive.  
The evidence presented above suggests that Pape, Bloom, and Moghadam’s 
theories of occupation, outbidding, and diffusion Al-Qaeda’s Jihadi ideology 
(respectively) fail to provide sufficient explanation for the Taliban’s resort to the use of 
suicide attack. Therefore, the paper turns to Horowitz’s diffusion of military innovation or 
adoption-capacity theory and terrorist innovation literature for a testable hypothesis. 
III. THEORY & METHOD 
Michael Horowitz’s (2010) adaption-capacity theory is an attempt to explain the 
variation in the diffusion of military innovation and the emulation of new techniques and 
technologies. The main puzzle he tries to resolve is why do certain military innovations 
diffuse throughout the system, while others (innovations) don’t? To this end, he 
postulates that “the diffusion of military power is mostly governed by two factors: the 
level of financial intensity required to adopt a military innovation, and the amount of 
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organizational capital required to adopt an innovation.”97 This means military 
innovations with a high financial intensity and organizational capital are less likely to 
diffuse, whereas, those with low financial intensity and organizational capital are more 
likely to diffuse and be adopted.  
Horowitz (2010) argues that his theory can also explain non-state actors’ 
behavior, specifically the adoption of suicide bombings. According to Horowitz (2010), 
while “the financial intensity of a suicide terror campaign is quite low… $150,” it 
requires a high level of organizational capital.98 “Given the high levels of organizational 
capital and low levels of financial intensity required to adopt suicide bombing, adoption 
capacity predicts that groups lacking a high level of organizational capital will be 
unlikely to adopt.”99 This means “more bureaucratized groups … with older 
organizational ages” that have developed “particular tactics” are unlikely to adopt 
suicide bombing.100  
Meanwhile, in the case of non-state actors, linkages to external terrorist groups 
are crucial in facilitating the process of diffusion or adoption of suicide attacks.101 
According to Horowitz, a direct link to external terrorist network or groups provides the 
opportunity to “coordinate and train together,” which makes it faster and easier to 
transfer the knowledge about new tactics.102 Therefore, “where there are direct links 
between terrorist groups, knowledge and suicide tactic should diffuse faster.”103 I 
therefore argue that diffusion through links to external terrorist groups is a key factor in 
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explaining suicide attacks. 
While Horowitz is right about the importance of organizational capital and links 
to external terrorist groups for emulating suicide attacks, it is equally important to 
remember that militant groups do not emulate or innovate for the sake of new tactics 
only or just because they are flexible; rather they do so to overcome an obstacle.104 It has 
been argued that “terrorist innovation is usually motivated by problem solving intended 
to overcome constraints in the security environment…”105 Innovation, at the non-state 
actor level, is defined “as the adoption of a tactic or technology that the given 
organization has not used or considered using in the past.”106 Thus, “problem solving 
rather than advantage-seeking drives the process to learn, adapt, and invent,” specially, 
when the terrorists are unable “to meet their objectives with extant methods.”107  
But what are some of the ‘constraints in the security environment’ that might 
cause insurgents to innovate or emulate a new tactic. Lack of “access to the full range of 
hardware and equipment sought by guerrillas” are pointed out as crucial factor.108 It has 
been argued that “in campaigns against capable counterinsurgent forces, it may be 
difficult for insurgents to acquire weapons … Security services may monitor borders 
and local markets and closely scrutinize local military forces to avoid illicit weapons 
diversions.”109 If the adversary is a very powerful country, it can also prevent insurgents 
from buying “weapons on international markets.”110  
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Based on this line of reasoning, arms embargo imposed by a strong adversary or 
the international community against insurgent groups should present a challenge and 
make insurgents to look for alternative tactics or homegrown weaponry “to overcome 
constraints in the security environment.”111 The main reason for the gravity of arms 
embargo imposed by  a strong adversary (e.g., U.S.) or the international community 
against insurgent groups is that they are better able to monitor the arms embargo. 
Furthermore, fear of retaliation by a strong adversary (e.g., U.S.) or the international 
community is more likely to deter third party nation-states from supplying effective 
weaponry to the insurgent groups. Therefore, militant organizations finding themselves 
in such circumstance should be more likely to look for alternative solutions.  
Meanwhile, both Horowitz and terrorist innovation literature assume 
“asymmetrical military disadvantages”112 and the ensuing “constraints in the security 
environment”113 to be a crucial factor in driving insurgents to innovate and find 
‘equalizers.’114 I refer to this power disparity that exerts force on the insurgents and 
limits their operational freedom as military pressure. I define military pressure as 
governments’ exercise of force through their security forces with a clearly stated 
objective of killing or capturing and targeting insurgents’ infrastructure to eliminate 
insurgency. 
Based on the above theoretical background, this paper argues that suicide attack 
is better understood as an innovation or emulation of a new technique to retaliate in 
asymmetric warfare, especially when insurgents face arms embargo, military pressure, 
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and have direct links to external terrorist groups. Thus, I hypothesize: 
 
H1: The existence of an arms embargo, the greater the military pressure, and/or 
the more direct the links to external terrorist groups, the more likely insurgents 
will resort to the use of suicide attacks. 
 
 
To test this hypothesis, I will be doing a case study using qualitative and quantitative data 
and systematically analyze these data drawn from variety of sources: books, articles, 
interviews, anecdotal accounts, newspapers, speech notes, reports, and surveys. However, 
it should be noted that when it comes to issues like insurgency or particular insurgent 
groups, and countries like Afghanistan, it is almost impossible to find systematic data 
even using various sources. Because of the lack of systematic data, there are some time 
periods that there are no data, and other times where there are data available.  
That being said, there are three independent variables in my hypothesis: 
arms embargo, military pressure, and diffusion. However, prior to elaborating more 
about their definition and operationalization, I would like to reiterate that my dependent 
variable is suicide attacks in Afghanistan, which is defined in this paper as an act of 
using one’s body as a weapon to kill or destroy the enemy or the target (e.g., human, 
building, vehicle).115 The more than three decades of Afghan conflict is a good 
representative of both non-suicide and suicide attacks campaigns, starting in 1978 to 
2010.116 To operationalize my dependent variable, I will be looking at the number of 
suicide attacks carried out in Afghanistan each year between 1978 and 2010.  
My first independent variable, arms embargo, is inferred from terrorist innovation  
                                                        
115 This definition is drawn from and is in line with those offered by Pape (2005, p. 10), Bloom (2005, p. 
76), Pedahzur (2005, pp. 8-12), and Moghadam (2008, p. 6).  
116 1978 to 2010 are the years for which reliable data is available. 
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literature’s emphasis on ‘constraints in security environment.’117 As already defined in the 
introduction of this paper, arms embargo means prevention of “direct or indirect supply, 
sale or transfer… of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and 
ammunition … [and] paramilitary equipment” to the insurgent groups.118 Due to nature of 
insurgency and secrecy surrounding their activities, it is impossible to attain systematic 
data for the operationalizing the impact of arms embargo over the years.  
One way to overcome this challenge is to look at the presence or absence of UN 
Security Council resolutions imposing arms embargo against the various Afghan 
insurgent groups and their affiliates between 1978 and 2010, and similarly whether or not 
the different insurgent groups (e.g., Mujahidin and Taliban) had third party nation-states 
explicitly arming them throughout the period under analysis (1978- 2010). Thus to 
operationalize arms embargo, I will look at the presence or absence of UN imposed arms 
embargoes along with the presence or absence of third party nation-states supplying 
weaponry to the Mujahidin and/or the Taliban between 1978 and 2010.  
Military pressure, my second independent variable, is inferred from Horowitz 
(2010) and terrorist innovation literature’s assumptions that “asymmetrical military 
disadvantages”119 and ensuing “constraints in the security environment”120 present a 
grave challenge to the insurgents, which should drive them to innovate and find 
‘equalizers.’121 I define what I call military pressure as governments’ exercise of force 
through their security forces with a clearly stated objective of killing or capturing and 
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121 Horowitz, Michael C, 2010, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 179. 
28 
targeting insurgents’ infrastructure to eliminate insurgency.  
To operationalize military pressure, I will look at a number of factors such as 
number of troops, military operations, enemy casualties, and holding the ground that are 
dependent on data availability. The increase in the number troops over the years means 
an increase in military pressure on the insurgents. The longer the military operations and 
the more troops involved in them should translate into increasing military pressure. The 
more the insurgents are killed, the more they are under military pressure. And finally, 
the more the military expands and holds the ground, the more pressure they exert on the 
insurgents by denying them safe havens. 
However, there are certain limitations with data for operationalizing military 
pressure. First the data are restricted to military operations conducted by the Afghan and 
foreign troops between 2002 and 2007, and number of the Afghan and foreign troops 
deployed between 2002 and 2009. This means my analysis of military pressure is 
restricted to the aforementioned time periods, whereas, reference to military pressure in 
the 1980s and 1990s is less systematic and more descriptive in nature, but nonetheless 
provides a picture of military pressure prior to 2002.  
Second, due to sensitivity surrounding military campaigns and the officials’ 
reluctance to release detailed data on all aspects of military operations, the number of 
troops that participated in each military operation and the duration of some of the 
military operations conducted between 2002 and 2007 are unknown. Meanwhile, it is 
hard to find systematic data on the numbers of insurgents killed each year. Finally, due 
the same reason of secrecy surrounding military operations, the number of military 
operations conducted each year presented in this paper (2002-2007) might vary from the 
29 
actual number. Still I have tried to be as accurate and inclusive as possible by making 
sure to at least have two sources, such as two different news media outlets, a media 
outlet with a congressional report or any other two combinations of different sources, for 
each of the military operations listed in this paper. Thus, due to data limitations, while it 
might be possible to see elements of military pressure emanating from some factors at 
one point, it might not be evident to see the same factors at other points. 
 Finally, diffusion, my third independent variable, is derived from Horowitz’s 
proposition about diffusion of military innovation and the importance of external links to 
the non-state actors. As explained earlier, Horowitz describes diffusion as “the process by 
which (1) an innovation (2) is communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) 
among the members of a social system.”122 For operationalizing diffusion, I will look at 
the presence or absence of a direct link between Afghan insurgent organizations and 
external terrorist groups or militant organizations throughout the period under analysis. 
Again, due to data limitations, there are periods with no systematic data on diffusion 
variable. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. 
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Figure 1. Causes of Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan 
 
 
As depicted in Figure 1, there are three independent variables – arms embargo, military 
pressure, and diffusion – that are causing suicide attacks. Individually, these variables 
might exert some influence on the occurrence of suicide attacks, however, I argue that the 
combination or presence of all three factors at one point in time makes it more likely that 
the Afghan insurgents will resort to the use of suicide attacks.  
IV. ANALYSIS  
In its more than three decades of insurgency and civil war (1978-2010), Afghanistan has 
only experienced suicide attacks in the 2000s. From 1978 to 2000, there was no incident 
of suicide attacks in Afghanistan.123 However, since the fall of the Taliban regime in 
2001, Afghanistan has increasingly experienced suicide attacks. Although accounts vary 
                                                        
123 “The Afghan Mujahidin rebels never resorted to suicide bombings against the Soviets in the 1980s, nor 
did the Taliban in the 1990s.” Source: Williams, Brian Glyn, 2011, Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to 
America's Longest War, (PENN: University of Pennsylvania Press), p. 202.  
The really first suicide attacks in the history of Afghanistan happened two days prior to 9/11 when two Arab 
terrorists assassinated the legendary leader of Afghan guerrilla warfare and anti-Taliban resistance, Ahmad 
Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001. Source: Coll, Steve. 2004. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of CIA, 
Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10 2001. New York: Penguin Press. 
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on the exact number of suicide attacks carried out each year since 2001, there is consensus 
on its dramatic rise since 2006.124 From 2001 to the end of 2005, Afghanistan witnessed a 
total of thirty-seven incidents of suicide attacks – one in 2001, one in 2002, two in 2003, 
six in 2004, twenty-seven in 2005.125 However, since 2006, the Taliban has employed 
over hundred suicide attacks each year up to 2010.126 Figure 1 illustrates the number of 
suicide attacks in Afghanistan between 1978 and 2010. 
 
Figure 2. Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan 1978 – 2010.127 
 
As Figure 2 depicts, the tactic that was totally unfamiliar to Afghans prior to 2001, has 
become a common phenomenon in Afghanistan. Taliban are increasingly using suicide 
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attacks as a tool in their fight against the US, NATO and Afghan forces. This presents a 
puzzle that why, contrary to their predecessors, did the Taliban resort to use of suicide 
attack in the 2000s in Afghanistan? To that end, the author argues that, in Afghanistan, 
three factors – arms embargo, military pressure, and direct link to an external terrorist 
network – combined to foster the use of suicide tactics. 
 The paper now turns to analyze the impact of each one the three independent 
variables on suicide attack in Afghanistan. 
A. Arms Embargo 
Since 1978, Afghanistan has been experiencing insurgency and civil war. The conflict, 
which initially started with small-scale armed reaction to the People Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan’s (PDPA) power grab in a bloody coup and ensuing repression in 1978, soon 
took the form of national uprising once the Soviets invaded the country a year later in 
1979. The fierce Afghan backlash to these un-welcome developments – communist 
PDPA’s power grab and Soviet invasion – led to the formation of several Mujahidin 
resistance groups in neighboring Pakistan and Iran.128 The resilience of Afghan Mujahidin 
against the Soviets attracted Western and Islamic countries’ attention to the Afghan Jihad, 
which translated into moral and material support.129  
Recalling his memories of the Afghan-Soviet war in a book co-authored with Mark  
Adkin, Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence’s (ISI) chief of Afghan Bureau, Brigadier 
Mohammad Yousaf, wrote:   
As I was about to discover, nothing moves, in peace or war, without money. The 
Mujahideen could achieve nothing without financial support. No matter how brilliant my 
strategy might be, the implementation depended on the availability of a vast reservoir of 
                                                        
128 Shay, Shaul, 2002, The Endless Jihad: The Mujahidin, the Taliban and Bin Laden. (The International 
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism), pp. 52-58. 
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cash with which to arm, train and move my forces. Almost half of this money originated 
from the US taxpayer, with the remainder coming from the Saudi Arabian government or 
rich Arab individuals.130 
 
It has been reported that the United States provided “between $4 billion and $5 billion to 
the mujahideen between 1980 and 1992,” with Saudi Arabia matching each U.S. dollar 
bill in “aid to the mujahideen” around the same period.131 Besides cash to support training 
and their other needs, Mujahidin were “well armed with US-supplied surface-to-air 
missiles, rockets, mortars, and communication equipment” that won them confrontations 
and made “successful ambushes” against Soviets “a daily phenomenon.”132  
The abundance of advanced weaponry and other military equipment along with 
generous funds explains a lot. It explains why the Afghans did not resort to the use of 
suicide attacks in their national uprising against Soviet invasion and their repressive 
puppet regime, which cost them an estimated 1.24 million lives,133 4.2 million wounded 
and maimed,134 and another 5 million refugees.135 That is, although the tactic was quite 
successful in places like Lebanon and Sri Lanka in the 1980s, it was simply not necessary 
in Afghanistan.136 
After nearly a decade of occupation, the Soviet troops withdrew (1989) and their 
puppet regime collapsed into the hands of the Mujahidin in 1992. The Mujahidin, 
however, failed to reach consensus on establishing an overarching and inclusive 
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government.137 As a result, the country went to a destructive civil war and witnessed the 
emergence of a new group called the Taliban in 1994.138  
It is believed that Mullah Omar established the Taliban movement in August 1994; 
however, their first major military encounter took place some two months later when they 
fought Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami forces on 13 October 1994. Soon after, they 
marched towards provincial capital of Kandahar province, and took it over from forces 
loyal to Hekmatyar on November 5, 1994.139  
The Mujahidin government in Kabul, led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
initially welcomed the Taliban movement for bringing security and order in Kandahar and 
collaborated with them in defending the Ghazni province from Hizb-e-Islami’s assault on 
January 25, 1995. With the conquest of the Wardak province from Hekmatyar’s forces on 
February 4, 1995, the Taliban became a viable force, controlling one-fifth of the 
Afghanistan’s provinces (six out of the thirty) in less than six months of their initial major 
military assault against Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami forces in Kandahar.140 
In early March of 1995, the Taliban movement secured a deal with Hizb-e-Wahdat, 
“an umbrella organization of seven Shiite Movements,” which enabled them to move to 
the western parts of the Kabul, previously controlled by Hizb-e-Wahdat.141 This bold 
move was threatening to the Rabbani-led Mujahidin government, which immediately 
launched a “surprise attack” that pushed back the Taliban and their newly allied Hizb-e-
Wahdat from Kabul, marking the “first defeat” of the Taliban since their uprising.142 
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Although not totally abandoning their assault on Kabul, the Taliban concentrated heavily 
on Heart province and eventually took it over from President Rabbani’s ally, Ismail Khan, 
on September 5, 1995. By October of the same year, once again the Taliban closed 
themselves to Kabul and brought it under siege by conquering some of the key peripheral 
districts such as Charasyab, Rishkhor, and Khairabad hills.143 
Meanwhile on the western front of the country, the Taliban made further gain by 
conquering the Ghor province in June 1996, and maintaining the pressure on Kabul with 
“heavy missile attacks.”144 Three months later on September 11, 1996, the Taliban 
conquered three eastern provinces including the vital city of Jalalabad, capital of 
Ningarhar province, which opened new logistical routes from Pakistan to the Taliban.145  
These gains put further pressure on the Rabbani government in Kabul, making it 
impossible to hold the capital. As a result the Rabbani-led Mujahidin forces withdrew 
from Kabul on September 27, 1996, paving the way for the Taliban to take it over without 
any resistance.146 The Taliban didn’t stop there and started pushing towards northern 
provinces, conquering the Bagram Airport, the key military airfield of the country located 
in north of Kabul, in January 1997. In May of the same year, the Taliban made a surprise 
short-lived advance in the north of the country by conquering Mazar-e-Sharif. However, 
due to their uncompromising policy, their newly won ally, General Malik, turned against 
them which cost the Taliban thousands of fighters and loss of the important northern city 
of Mazar-e-Sharif.147 In October 1997, the Taliban regrouped to retake Mazar-e-Sharif, 
however, their endeavor failed. Eventually the city fell to the Taliban a year later in 
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August 1998.148 By 2001, “the Taliban controlled over 90 percent of Afghanistan,” 
pushing their opponent – Northern Alliance – into northeast corner of the country.149 
The Taliban’s miracle-like swift advances were not possible without extensive 
support from Pakistan and Gulf countries. “The Taliban movement … drew on the 
military backing of Pakistan and financial support of Saudi Arabia.”150 It has been 
reported that Pakistan directly contributed “to the Taliban’s military campaign with its 
own forces … [and] at times provided air cover … This support was in addition to, and 
quite separate from, the weapons consignments dispatched to Afghanistan as part of 
Pakistan’s publicly stated support for the Taliban.”151 According to one account, “As 
many as 30 trucks a day crossed the border [from Pakistan] into Afghanistan carrying 
artillery shells, tank rounds, and rocket-propelled grenades.”152 Not only that, “the 
Pakistani aircraft assisted with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat 
operations.”153 Furthermore, “between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 
Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan,” which led one commentator to label it a 
“creeping invasion.”154  
That is why the Taliban didn’t resort to the use of suicide attack prior to 2001, 
simply because they were not under arms embargo and received extensive military 
equipment and support from Pakistan. However, after the incident of 9/11 and the 
Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden and the subsequent U.S. attack on  
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Afghanistan, the Taliban’s fortune and circumstances changed.  
The day after 9/11, the U.S. deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, called 
General Mahmood Ahmad, chief of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who was 
in the United States visiting the CIA at the time. During the 15 minute “short and … hard-
hitting conversation,” Armitage conveyed President Bush’s message to Pakistanis: 
"You're with us or against us."155 Armitage told General Mahmood that “The president 
was speaking out forcefully, not only against those who conducted operations of terror, 
but those who supported terrorism or allowed terrorists to exist, and to think carefully.”156 
The next day, Richard Armitage summoned the Pakistani ambassador, Dr. Maleeha 
Lohdi, along with General Mahmood Ahmad and “laid out seven non-negotiable steps the 
Pakistanis must take” in regards to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The list included “ending 
… logistical supports to Al-Qaeda,” preventing Taliban’s recruit “from reaching” 
Afghanistan, providing “overflight and territorial access rights … to U.S. military forces 
and intelligence agencies,” and breaking all ties “with the Taliban government” if they fail 
to hand over Osama.157 Within the next 24 hours, the Pakistani “President Musharaf … 
agreed to all seven demands.”158  
Pakistan wanted to immediately cut off its relationship with the Taliban prior to 
launch of the US invasion, but the United States asked Pakistanis to “maintain a hold and 
a contact with the Taliban – if only a tenuous one … to resolve the fate of the [western] 
hostages” taken by the Taliban.159 However, when the Taliban refused to hand over 
                                                        
155 PBS.org. “Interview: Richard Armitage.” Available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/armitage.html 
156 Ibid. 
157 Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall, 2011, Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way, (Yale University Press), p. 
63. 
158 Ibid., p. 63. 
159 PBS.org. “Interview: Richard Armitage.” Available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/armitage.html 
38 
Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistani 
President Musharaf dismissed General Mahmood Ahamd, head of ISI and a Taliban 
sympathizer, in a show of resolve and signal to the United States about his dedication in 
supporting the U.S. campaign and “going in a new direction.”160 
The next blow came to the Taliban on September 22, 2001, when the United Arab 
Emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, two of its three allies, “withdrew their 
recognition of the Taliban as the legal government of Afghanistan.”161 Finally, after the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and disintegration of the Taliban regime, “The UN Security 
Council, on January 16, 2002, unanimously established an arms embargo and the freezing 
of identifiable assets belonging to bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the remaining Taliban.” 162 
Although Pakistan initially cut its official ties with the Taliban and supported the 
U.S. led campaign by deploying more than 70,000 troops along the Afghan border and 
launching several military operations throughout the years, the Afghan Taliban were 
tacitly allowed to shelter in Pakistan and were not made the real targets of these military 
operations.163 However, it was not until 2005 that sporadic reports emerged about some 
elements within the Pakistani intelligence establishment (ISI) assisting Taliban with 
“tactical, operational, and strategic” intelligence to evade the US and NATO led military 
operations.164 The Pakistanis started doing this due to the fear of growing Indian influence 
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in Afghanistan.165 However, there is no hard evidence to prove that the Taliban receive 
state-sponsored large caches of effective weaponry even from the United States’ bitter 
rival in the region–the Islamic republic of Iran–since the UN imposed arms embargo.166 
Robert M. Gates, then Defense Secretary of the United States, “said during a visit to 
Kabul … that there was no evidence as yet that Tehran government officials are involved 
in shipping weapons to the country for use against U.S. and NATO forces.”167  
Thus the Taliban, which used to be endowed with abundant external resources and 
support from Pakistan and Gulf States in their fight against the Mujahidin government 
(1994-96) and later against the Northern Alliance (1996-2001), faced the lack of effective 
military equipment in the post 9/11 era. In such circumstances, scholars argue that the 
need for “leveling the playing field for groups that perceive themselves to be militarily 
disadvantaged is a key reason why groups decide to employ this tactic [suicide 
attacks].”168 Therefore, “clearly the Taliban have embraced this once-taboo asymmetric 
tactic and see suicide bombers—who are referred to as ‘Mullah Omar’s missiles’—as an 
equalizer, much as the Stinger ground-to-air missile was in the 1980s.”169 
Given that arms embargo was in place since 2002 and suicide attacks started taking 
off in 2005, only to reach their climax in 2006, one might wonder what explains the gap 
and late showdown of the Taliban with suicide attacks? There are two complementary 
explanations for this puzzle. First, as will be explained in the military pressure and 
diffusion sections, the Taliban were badly beaten in the initial two months of the US 
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invasion of Afghanistan, and were under military pressure since then. This means that it 
was hard for the Taliban to immediately regroup and come with possible alternative 
solutions to overcome the challenge posed by the arms embargo. 
A second more likely and supplementary explanation is the timing of diffusion of 
suicide attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan, which will be elaborate in detail in the diffusion 
section. The process of diffusion of suicide attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan started 
sometime during 2004, but more coordination took place in 2005, making the presence of 
all three proposed factors possible in late 2005 to early 2006. The presence of arms 
embargo, military pressure and diffusion at one point in time (late 2005 to early 2006) 
resulted in the surge of suicide attacks in 2006. This is in line with the argument of this 
paper that suicide attacks are more likely when all three factors are present at one point in 
time. 
B. Military Pressure 
There is no systematic data about the number of military operations conducted by the 
Soviets and the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan’s (PDPA) forces against the 
Mujahidin in the 1980s. However, what is evident is the overall number of the Soviet 
troops and the PDPA’s forces fighting the Mujahidin. In 1978, the number of PDPA’s 
military personnel was estimated to be 90,000.170  This number, however, decreased to 
35,000 troops over the next four years until 1981.171 The decrease in the number of 
Kabul’s communist government forces made the Soviets compensate with their own 
troops by increasing their military forces in Afghanistan from 85,000 in 1981 to 130,000 
in 1985.172  
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Meanwhile by 1985, the number of the Afghan Mujahidin fighting the Soviets and 
their puppet regime were reported to be some 250,000.173 Although in the first half of the 
1980s, “the Soviets had advantage in firepower,” this would soon change once the United 
States start supplying Stinger missiles.174 Even in the first half of the 1980s, the Soviets 
were constrained to major cities, whereas the Afghan Mujahidin “were able to take 
control of most of the countryside.”175 The sheer number of the Afghan Mujahidin and the 
sixty percent decrease in the number of PDPA’s armed forces vividly illustrates Afghans’ 
bitterness towards the Soviet invaders and their puppet communist regime in Kabul, and 
their willingness to fight and expel the Soviets and to topple the PDPA. 
The evidence presented shows that while there was battlefield power asymmetry in 
the initial years of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, the Mujahidin access to outside 
weaponry supplies and their overwhelmingly large number changed battlefield dynamics 
into their favor in the second half of the 1980s. The access to weaponry and absence of 
severe power asymmetry mean that the Mujahidin were not challenged to the extent to 
look for alternative solutions. Meanwhile, the mere absence of arms embargo during the 
1980s supports the author’s proposition that the likelihood of suicide attacks is high when 
all three factors are present at one point in time. Thus the absence of arms embargo in the 
1980s mean that it was less likely for the Mujahidin to resort to the use of suicide attacks.  
However, for the decade of the 1990s, there is literally no evidence about the 
number of attacks between various warring Mujahidin parties and the number of their 
fighters, and similarly there is little evidence about skirmishes between the Taliban and 
the Mujahidin and the number of forces involved. Given the Taliban’s swift rise to power 
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in two years from rebellion to ruling (1994-1996), and their access to extensive military 
equipment and support from Pakistan and fund from Saudi, discussed in the previous 
sections, it is evident that the Taliban did not face battlefield obstacles and power 
asymmetry or military pressure from their adversary to resort to the use of suicide attacks. 
Again this is in line with the author’s main argument that the presence of all three 
independent variables at one point in time makes it highly likely for suicide attacks to 
occur.  
That being said, there is some systematic qualitative and quantitative data for the 
2000s, albeit limited, that would help in operationalizing the military pressure variable in 
the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan. As explained earlier, for operationalizing 
military pressure in the 2000s, I will be looking at the number of Afghan and foreign 
troops between 2002 and 2009. An increase in their number would translate into 
battlefield disadvantage and pressure to the Taliban.  
Meanwhile, I look at the number of military operations launched by the US and 
NATO led coalition troops against the Taliban, which means the more the number of 
troops involved and the lengthier the operations, the more pressure they should exert on 
the Taliban by killing or capturing them and denying them safe havens. Along the same 
line, the more casualties caused to the insurgents from the military operations or aerial 
bombing should mean that the insurgents are under pressure. And lastly expansion of 
troops and holding the ground by establishing bases literally mean denial of safe havens to 
the Taliban, which mean they are under military pressure. Once again it should be 
reminded that our data have limitations and everything is not in the numbers.  
The number of foreign troops and Afghan secrurity forces steadily increased over 
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the years between 2002 and 2009. Figure 3, 4, 5, illustrates the number of Afghan 
National Army (ANA), U.S. troops, and NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF) between 2002 and 2009 respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of Afghan National Army  2003 – 2009.176 
 
Note: Figure 3 does not include approximately 30 to 60 thousand militias loyal to 
warlords who were involved in action against the Taliban.177 Also excluded here is the 
number of Afghan National Police, which experienced the similar rate of growth and were 
mostly involved in action against the insurgents.178 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of US Forces in Afghanistan  2002 – 2009.179 
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Figure 5. Number of Other Foreign Troops, Excluding US Forces  2002 – 2009.180 
 
The steady increase in the number of the Afghan National Army (Feagure 3), U.S. troops 
(Figure 4), and NATO led ISAF forces (Figure 5) corresponds to the author’s proposition 
that increase in the number of troops over the years should exert pressure on the 
insrurgents by killing, capturing, and denying them safe havens. 
 That being said, the paper turns to detailed discussion of these military operations 
that were conducted between 2002 and 2007– the years for which some systematic data 
was available. I would like to mention that due to data limitation, it was not possible to 
present the number of troops involved in each military operation, duration of each of these 
operations, or casualties caused to the insurgents in a table. Therefore, following part of 
this section is a blend of qualitative and quantitative analysis to show the impact of these 
military operations on restricting the Taliban’s conventional fighting capabilities, which 
further exacerbated battlefied power asymmetry and made the Taliban to look for 
alternative tactics (e.g., suicide attaks).  
Another crucial point before getting into detailed discsussion of military 
operations between 2002 and 2007, is that after killing some ten to thirty thoudand 
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Taliban fighters and their affiliates in the initial two months of invasion (Oct 07 - Dec 07, 
2001),181 the U.S. and NATO led international troops mainly started the following 
military operations with the intent of wiping out the remnants of the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda altogether. Since the total number of the Taliban forces during the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan was approximated to be thirty to fifty thousands,182 this means that the 
Taliban were already badly beaten before these military operations. 
1. Military Operations (2002 - 2007) 
After total demise of the Taliban regime on December 9, 2001,183 Operation Anaconda 
was the first one of the four major military operations launched in 2002 in Afghanistan. In 
March 2002, a total of two thousand seven hundred troops from the U.S. (1000), NATO 
allies (200), and the Afghan National Army (1500) came together to wipe out the 
remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda that were believed to be hiding in the Shah-i-Khot 
Valley of the Paktia province in eastern Afghanistan. The insurgents, numbering roughly 
2,000, sustained a heavy loss (400 dead) from 3,500 bombs dropped on their strongholds 
during the US-led offensive.184 However, due to coalition troops’ heavy reliance on 
intensive aerial bombardments and their poor ground coordination, the rest of the 
insurgents managed to evade them and submerge into the Pakistani tribal areas.185  
Operation Mountain Lion (June 2002) followed Operation Anaconda in the 
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southeastern mountains of Afghanistan. The objective of the operation was to deny safe-
havens to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Meanwhile in early to mid 2002, British troops 
conducted Operation Jacana – a series of offensives – to dismantle the Taliban’s bases and 
supplies in the southeastern mountains of Afghanistan.186 As a result, larges cache of the 
Taliban’s weaponry and their bases, encompassing cluster of caves, were captured and 
destroyed by the British-led offensive.187 In late August 2002, Southeastern Afghanistan 
witnessed Operation Mountain Sweep. During the operation, the coalition troops 
unearthed five weaponry stockpiles, along with Taliban documents.188 These operations 
were so intense that even children as young as 13 years old were arrested and sent to 
Guantanamo Bay.189  
Meanwhile, Afghanistan witnessed seven large military operations during 2003. In 
January, the coalition launched Operation Mongoose. Besides seizing and destroying a 
large stockpile of armaments, the coalition troops killed twenty-two and captured thirteen 
insurgents during the operation.190 Right after Operation Mongoose, the US-led coalition 
troops launched Operation Valiant Strike in eastern Afghanistan on 20 March 2003. The 
operation, which coincided with the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, was launched based 
on the intelligence received from Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s interrogation. Six hundred 
troops, including conventional and Special Forces units, were deployed in action that 
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resulted in confiscation of “more than 170 rocket-propelled grenades, as well as mines 
and mortar rounds, the third such weapons cache discovered in the area …  [along with] 
heavy machine-guns, rocket-propelled grenades, 82mm mortar rounds, and 107mm 
rockets.”191 
The day Operation Valiant Strike ended, US troops launched Operation Desert 
Lion in northeastern Afghanistan’s Kohi-Safi Mountains. During the operation, the troops 
found large caches of weaponry. In June of 2003 as part of new military operation called 
Operation Dragon Fury, a brigade-sized US and Italian forces launched an offensive 
which resulted in small-scale confrontation with the Taliban and twenty-one arrests. 192 
Over the next month (July 23, 2003), U.S. led coalition troops launched Operation 
Warrior Seep "to kill, capture and deny sanctuary to anti-coalition fighters and to disrupt 
anti-coalition activity" in the southern Afghanistan’s villages and mountains.193 Besides 
confiscating six stockpiles of the Taliban’s weaponry,194  the US-led offensive of more 
than 3,000 troops, killed and arrested ‘dozens’ of the Taliban in the action.195 
Late 2003 witnessed two more military operations. Operation Mountain Viper 
(September 2003) was launched in Zabul province to clear pockets of the Taliban and 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s forces from the area. Coalition troops killed some seventy to one 
hundred insurgent fighters during the operation.196 The year 2003 ended with Operation 
Avalanche (December 2003). Operation Avalanche began in the eastern and southern part 
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of the country.197 The operation “uncovered caches of rifles, pistols, rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers, howitzers, plus rockets, artillery shells, land mines, and other 
ammunition.”198 During the offensive, more than one hundred insurgents were arrested 
and ten more were killed in the action.199 
The next year, 2004, witnessed six large military operations. The coalition troops 
started their new year with Operation Mountain Blizzard (Jan 2004). During the two 
months long operation, coalition troops “conducted 1,731 patrols and 143 raids and 
cordon-and-search operations” that resulted in discovery of large stockpiles of weaponry 
such as “3,648 rockets, 3,202 mortar rounds, 2,944 rocket- propelled grenades, 3,000 rifle 
rounds, 2,232 mines and tens of thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition.”200 
Meanwhile, twenty-two anti-coalition fighters were killed during the operation and a 
bunch of others were arrested.201  Right after Operation Mountain Blizzard, the US-led 
coalition deployed more than 13,000 strong forces as part of Operation Mountain Storm 
“in the south, southeast, and eastern” regions of the country to ‘kill or capture’ and 
‘search-and-destroy’ the insurgents and their infrastructures.202  
Meanwhile, June 2004 witnessed Operation Thunder Road. “The 14-day operation 
netted an impressive quantity of arms, ammunition, and ordnance … [and] those enemy 
                                                        
197 KOMO News. “Operation Avalanche Wraps Up In Afghanistan.” August 31, 2006. Available at 
http://www.komonews.com/news/archive/4113726.html 
198 GlobalSecurity.Org. “Operation Avalanche.” Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef-avalanche.htm 
199 KOMO News. “Operation Avalanche Wraps Up In Afghanistan.” August 31, 2006. Available at 
http://www.komonews.com/news/archive/4113726.html 
200 GlobalSecurity.Org. “Operation Moutain Blizzard.” Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040313-afps01.htm 
201 Lansford, Tom. “Counterinsurgency: A Strategy for the 21st Century.” Available at 
http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1524182 
&currentSection=1523498&productid=34 
202 GlobalSecurity.Org. “Operation Mountain Storm.” Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef-mountain_storm.htm 
49 
fighters who rose up to resist the Marines were quickly dealt with.”203 On July 2004, the 
U.S.-led coalition troops launched Operation Lightening Resolve. This time, besides 
hunting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the operation also meant to provide security for 
Afghanistan’s election process.204 Major Robert Ault disclosed information about the 
changing nature of the insurgency and the coalition’s new ‘tactics’ in engaging them. 
According to Ault, insurgents “stood and fought, but sustained losses probably in the 
hundreds … They learned every time they engage us, they lose… [Thus] we’re seeing the 
enemy transition into smaller formations and pick its fights more carefully.”205  
The year ended with two new military operations that were launched in December 
(2004) and continued to early 2005. Operation Thunder Freedom and Operation Lightning 
Freedom were jointly launched to hit the insurgents hard during their weakness – winter 
season. An estimated 18,000 foreign troops participated in the winter offensive.206 
Meanwhile, another important objective of these operations was to force the insurgents to 
accept amnesty offered by the newly elected Afghan government and coalition troops. 207 
In addition to Operation Thunder Freedom and Operation Lightning Freedom that 
started in December 2004 and continued to early 2005, coalition troops along with their 
Afghan counterparts launched six large military operations during 2005. Operation Spurs 
(Jan - Feb),208 Operation Mavericks (Mar-Apr),209 and Operation Celtics (May),210 were 
                                                        
203 Milks, Keith A. “22nd MEU Afghanistan Recap: Operation.” Sept 2, 2004. Available at 
http://www.22ndmeu.marines.mil/News/ArticleView/tabid/196/Article/2178/22nd-meu-afghanistan-recap-
operation-thunder-road.aspx 
204 Banusiewicz, John D. “Lightning Resolve to Protect Afghan Election Process.” July 14, 2004. Available 
at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=25707 
205 Ibid. 
206 BBC News. “US begins new Afghan operation.” Dec 11, 2004.  Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4087647.stm 
207 Feickert, Andrew. 2005a. “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism:  Afghanistan, 
Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia.” Available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32758.pdf 
208 Task Force Trinity. “Operation SPURS (29 Jan – 4 Feb 05).” Jan 29, 2005. Available at 
http://www.taskforcetrinity.com/archives/976 
209 Mattingly, Rich. “Operation Mavericks Captures Suspected Terrorists.” Apr 5, 2005. Available at 
50 
three back-to-back operations in early 2005 that resulted in disclosing several stockpiles 
of weaponry and explosives, and arrest of suspected militants.  
However, it should be noted that most of the large caches of weaponry found 
during military operations throughout the years are believed to be those left behind by the 
Soviet Army and later by the Taliban regime.211 
The rest of 2005 witnessed three more military operations. In June 2005, the 
coalition troops launched Operation Red Wings to hunt down insurgents and disrupt their 
activities in the Kunar province. At least 465 insurgents were killed in the ongoing 
battle.212 In August 2005, the coalition launched Operation Whalers to capitalize on the 
achievements of Operation Red Wings in Kunar. Coalition troops along with their Afghan 
counterparts stormed the valleys and mountains of the Kunar province, with their fighter 
planes searching from the sky. The two operations eventually attained their main objective 
that was to terminate Ahmad Shah, a notorious militant commander with a “small army of 
barbarous fighters.”213 The year ended with Operation Pil (Elephant). Damages inflicted 
to the enemy during Operation Pil were not made public.214 In several sporadic 
engagements during 2005, an estimated 235 insurgents were killed by coalition 
warplanes.215  
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Unable to face coalition and Afghan troops mainly due to losses suffered during 
military operation and aerial bombardments, the Taliban shifted tactics in 2005. 
According to Afghan and U.S. military commanders, “to avoid additional casualties … 
insurgents have recently begun ambushing soldiers with the roadside improvised 
explosives that have proven successful in Iraq.”216 Meanwhile, the insurgents also started 
employing suicide attacks against the Afghan government targets and foreign troops in 
2005.217 
During 2006, coalition and Afghan forces conducted six large-scale military 
operations. Operation Mountain Lion was the first to be launched in Kunar province on 
March 25, 2006. The operation, which included some 2,500 coalition and Afghan troops, 
conducted “over 650 patrols.”218 Besides killing 80 Taliban fighters, the coalition and 
Afghan troops discovered 12 weaponry caches during the operation.219 Operation 
Mountain Thrust followed Operation Mountain Lion in May. Dubbed to be as one of the 
largest since the fall of the Taliban regime, Operation Mountain Thrust was a big blow to 
the Taliban who lost 1,100 fighters on the battlefield and another 400 as captives.220 
In mid-July 2006, Canadian and Afghan forces with some support from U.S., 
British and Dutch troops, launched an offensive called Operation Zahara (Battle of 
Panjwaii I) to clear the Taliban from Panjwaii. The operation cleared the Taliban’s 
presence from the area, but, shortly after coalition and Afghan troops withdrew from 
Panjwaii, reports of the Taliban activity in the area started circulating. Canadian and 
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Afghan forces with support of other allies launched Operation Medusa (Battle of Panjwaii 
II) to eradicate the insurgents from the area. During their two-week long operation around 
Kandahar city, coalition and Afghan forces killed “512 Taliban fighters” on the ground 
and arrested “another 136” of them.221  
On September 16, 2006, coalition troops along with their Afghan counterparts 
launched Operation Mountain Fury in eastern Afghanistan.222 Although the Taliban had 
started employing suicide attacks in skirmishes with the coalition and Afghan troops a 
year ago, the tactic was heavily used in their counter-offensive during Operation 
Mountain Fury. The Taliban employed some 23 suicide bombers in their retaliatory 
assaults during Operation Mountain Fury.223 The four month long operation resulted in 
deaths of more than 1,100 Taliban and arrest of 179 of them.224 Mullah Akhtar 
Mohammad Osmani, a prominent figure in the Taliban movement, was among those 
killed during the operation on December 19, 2006.225  
In addition to Operation Mountain Fury, coalition and Afghan troops also 
launched Operation Falcon Summit in the southern Afghanistan in December 2006. The 
operation successfully removed the Taliban from areas around Kandahar city.226 
Meanwhile during 2006, the U.S. and NATO-led foreign troops heavily relied on aerial 
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bombardments, numbering “more than 2,000 air strikes,” which increased civilian 
casualties and Afghans’ resentment to such operations.227 
The year 2007 started with a British offensive, called Operation Volcano (Jan-
Feb), to secure areas around the Kajaki dam in the southern Afghanistan’s Helmand 
Province.228 It was the first of the seven large-scale military operations to be conducted in 
2007 in Afghanistan. Soon after it successfully ended, the NATO-led troops mounted a 
much larger and ambitious offensive with 6,500 troops – Operation Achilles – to clear the 
insurgents from the whole province – Helmand.229 The biggest achievement of the 
operation for coalition and Afghan troops was the assassination of Mullah Dadullah – a 
fierce anti-coalition campaigner and advocate of suicide attacks.230 Mullah Dadullah was 
also the most prominent commander to be killed in the six-year long campaign against the 
Taliban’s insurgency. During the three months long campaign (March 6 to May 30 2007), 
the coalition and Afghan troops killed approximately 700 to 1,000 Taliban fighters.231 
Around the same time two other military operations – Operation Silver and Operation 
Silicon – were conducted as part of an effort “to keep up pressure on the Taliban” in the 
southern Afghanistan.232  
The day Operation Achilles ended (May 30, 2007), NATO led ISAF forces 
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launched Operation Pickaxe-Handle in Helmand province. The outcome of the operation 
is disputed because soon after their withdrawal, Taliban activities were reported in areas 
surrounding Kajaki dam.233 To build on their disputed “momentum and strategic success 
of” Operation Pickaxe-Handle, the British-led NATO troops in the south of the country 
launched Operation Ghartse Gar.234 The operation was a success in clearing the Taliban 
stronghold from Sangin district of the Helmand province. During the operation, unknown 
numbers of the “Taliban were destroyed, or managed to escape from the area.”235 The 
year ended with Operation Rock Avalanche in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar province, 
which killed some twenty insurgents.236  
 According to one account, from 2002 to 2009, “overall insurgent losses have been 
estimated to be between 25,000 and 30,000, with 20,000 captured.”237 This level of 
casualty in itself is a good indicator of pressure on the Taliban.  
Meanwhile, besides the large-scale military operations launched to search and 
destroy the insurgents and their hideouts, U.S. and coalition Special Forces separately 
tasked with ‘capturing or killing’ leaders of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were also operating 
in Afghanistan during these years.238 Due to the top-secret nature of Special Forces 
operations, the exact number of their raids per year is unknown. However, a recent leak in 
2010 put the number of raids around ‘200 a month,’ which means special forces 
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conducted 24,000 night raid operations in 2010 with 50 to 60 percent success in capturing 
or killing their targets.239 The disclosed figures further show that ‘368 insurgents leaders’ 
have been arrested or killed by special forces during the three months of these 
operations.240  
The detailed analysis of military operations supports the author’s proposition that 
states’ exercise of force through its security forces hinders insurgents’ capabilities and 
denies them access to safe havens, which subsequently makes insurgents resort to 
alternative method or tactics to compensate for their battlefield disadvantages. 
A final note on military pressure variable is the shift in the foreign troops’ earlier 
policy of ‘kill or capture’ or ‘search and destroy’ and leave the area to one of establishing 
bases and holding the grounds after clearing them from insurgents. This, I argued, exerts 
pressure on the insurgents by denying them access to their safe havens. Figure 6 illustrates 
the expansion the NATO led ISAF forces from Kabul to rest of the country between 2004 
and 2006.  
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Figure 6. NATO-led ISAF Forces Expansion 2004 – 2006.241 
 
As illustrated by arrows in Figure 6, the first phase of NATO led ISAF troops’ expansion 
started from Kabul to the North of the country in a bid to support the Afghan government 
in 2004. The next year (2005) witnessed the ISAF expanding its domain of operations and 
bases to the Western region of the country. Since the northern and western regions of 
Afghanistan were not the hubs of the insurgents, ISAF expansion did not deny them 
access to their safe havens, and we should not expect a backlash. However, in early 2006 
the NATO led ISAF troops announced to move to the Afghanistan’s southern and eastern 
regions, which were the Taliban’s strongholds. ISAF’s move to the insurgents’ hotspots 
meant to deny the Taliban access to their sanctuaries, which meant exerting military 
pressure on the Taliban. Therefore, the year 2006 witnessed a five-fold increase in number 
of suicide attacks from 27 in 2005 to a 139 suicide attacks.  
 However, two points should be noted: first, there were some U.S. troops stationed in 
the South and East of Afghanistan; and second, by the end of 2005 diffusion of suicide 
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attacks from Iraq to Afghanistan, had already taken place through direct connections to 
the Iraqi insurgents. Thus the end of 2005 to early 2006 in Afghanistan was the period 
when the three factors were present at one point in time, which should explain the sudden 
rise of suicide attacks in Afghanistan. The paper now turns to detailed discussion of 
diffusion.    
C. Diffusion 
There are no systematic data to prove the link between the Afghan Mujahidin and 
Hezbollah of Lebanon to explore diffusion of suicide attacks. However, there were Arab 
fighters fighting against the Soviets alongside the Afghan Mujahidin in the second half of 
the 1980s.242 It was during this time when the Saudi-born Osama bin Laden first traveled 
to the region and opened a guesthouse for the Arab fighters in 1988 in Pakistan, which 
later become known as Al-Qaeda.243 After the Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
Osama and other Arab fighters returned to their home countries.244 It was not until the mid 
1990s that Osama would reappear in Afghanistan once again.   
 In 1996, under the U.S. and British led international community pressure, the 
Sudanese government deported Osama bin Laden.245 Unable and uninterested to go back 
to Saudi,246 Osama headed towards Afghanistan where he had spent years during the 
Afghan Jihad against the Soviets, and where a radical group was taking hold and 
becoming the main player – the Taliban.247 The Taliban leadership welcomed their 
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wealthy guest who needed “security and sanctuary,” but could provide “much needed 
financial resources,” training to the Taliban fighters, and a “well trained 055 Brigade (a 
group of 500 to 1000 Arab fighters) for key battles” against the Northern Alliance.248  
 It was here in Afghanistan that Osama reassessed his organization’s (Al-Qaeda) 
operational strategy. As a result of reassessment and the ensuing strategic shift in the 
organizations’ modus operandi; Al Qaeda decided to target the west, especially the United 
States rather than fighting their so-called Arab puppet regimes.249 As such, Al-Qaeda 
under Osama bin Laden’s direct supervision, “planned various operations, including 
September 11” against the United States.250 The total number of attacks orchestrated by 
Al-Qaeda against the U.S. and its allies between 1996 and 2003 is estimated to be twenty-
one suicide bombings, with 9/11 marking the deadliest in the history of this lethal 
tactic.251  
As evidence shows, while the Taliban benefited from the presence of al-Qaeda and 
its resources in their war against Northern Alliance, they did not endorse Al-Qaeda’s new 
tactic at the time (prior to 9/11). This I argue is purely due to resource endowment and 
battlefield dynamics that were in favor of the Taliban at the time; a scenario that rapidly 
shifted after 9/11.  
Just within the first two months (Oct 07 - Dec 07, 2001) of Operation Enduring 
Freedom – the United States retaliation to 9/11 incident that mainly aimed at hunting 
down Al-Qaeda leader and overthrowing the Taliban regime – the U.S. and its allied 
forces killed some ten to thirty thousand of the Taliban and their al-Qaeda affiliates,252 
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and destroyed their infrastructure.253 According to Shaul Shay (2002), “The Taliban forces 
… usually did not number more than thirty thousand soldiers, but in preparation for 
important battles recruitment was increased … [to] reach fifty thousand soldiers.”254 This 
immediate blow to their ranks and capacities along with loss of external resources and 
arms embargo put the Taliban in the difficult position. The subsequent military operations 
exerted further pressure on the Taliban and their supplies. Brigadier Roger Lane, senior 
commander of the British commandos, describes the impacts of military operations on 
insurgents’ supplies as follows:  
History has taught us that killing or capturing individual members of a terrorist group, 
whilst a bonus where it can be achieved, is not always the most effective means to deliver 
a strategic blow to that group's operational capability… Disrupting their planning, 
destroying their logistic supplies and denying them a safe haven is at least as important, 
often more so.255 
 
Adding to that, Maj. Lewis Matson, Central Command spokesperson, said "There's no 
question that they've [Taliban] been denied sanctuary… That's really the key element 
here. They don't have the ability to assemble in mass.... It's fire an RPG (rocket-propelled 
grenade) and run."256 
Looking at these unwelcome developments and shifting battlefield dynamics in 
favor of the adversary, Al-Qaeda proposed the use of suicide attacks. Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
al-Qaeda’s second in command, argued in favor of suicide attacks as “the most successful 
way of inflicting damage against the opponent and the least costly to the Mujahedin in 
terms of casualties.”257 Initially, Mullah Omar was reluctant, but the proposal had a great 
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appeal to his field commanders, especially Mullah Dadullah.258 “By 2003, the Taliban 
field commanders were clearly interested in any strategy or tactic that allowed them to 
undermine” the U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan.259 In early 2003 in an interview with 
BBC, Mullah Dadullah said: "The ground became hot for the Russians here, and so … the 
ground will also become hot for the Americans."260  
The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent success of the Iraqi suicide attack 
campaign in late 2003 and early 2004 seemed to have convinced the Taliban leadership 
about the effectiveness of the new tactic against “seemingly invincible” enemy – the 
United Sates.261 As early as “2004, several camps were established just across the border” 
in Pakistani tribal areas to train the Taliban fighters the new skill set transferred from 
Iraq.262 According to some experts, “there is evidence of cooperation between insurgents 
in Iraq and Afghanistan… small number of Pakistani and Afghan militants received 
military training in Iraq; Iraqi fighters met with Afghan and Pakistani extremists in 
Pakistan,” which translated into the use of “homemade bombs, suicide attacks, and other 
tactics honed in Iraq” to the Afghan battlefield.263 Definitely, Al-Qaeda was the main hub 
for connecting Afghan/Pakistani insurgents to Iraqi militants.264 Mohammad Daud, 
Hamza Sangari, and Mullah Haq Yar were among those Taliban fighters “dispatched to 
Iraq by Mullah Omar to learn the Iraqi insurgents’ tactics.”265  
Meanwhile, Iraqi Jihadi videos dubbed in the Pashtu language started circulating in 
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Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas (FATA) as early as summer of 2004. These 
so-called ‘kill DVDs’ filled with videos of targeted suicide bombings against the 
Americans in Iraq were encouraging and promising for the Taliban operatives who had 
experienced their own devastation by the American aerial bombings.266 Similarly there are 
reports of “three-man delegation … sent by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi… [to] met Osama bin 
Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and Mullah Omar…. The delegation brought audio and video 
material justifying suicide attacks.”267 
However, for the Taliban it was not enough. They needed something not only to 
encourage and inspire, but also to justify the previously unknown and forbidden act of 
suicide among the locals. Therefore, the Taliban were interested in videos from the 
Afghan battlefield with local texture. To address the Taliban’s need, Abu Yahya al Libi, 
an Al-Qaeda operative in the region, started making Iraqi-modeled Afghan videos. Some 
of the main videos were “Holocaust for the Americans in Afghanistan, Pyre for the 
Americans in Afghanistan, and The Wind of Paradise.”268  
In 2005, Mullah Dadullah started a campaign to “win hearts and minds in order to 
develop an organized strategy of suicide attacks for the 2006 offensive. He showed audio 
and video material from the Iraqi resistance which explained that suicide attacks were 
permitted and demonstrated how the Iraqis used them as their most effective weapon.”269 
Ahmad Rashid argues that “Many of the initial suicide bombers were Pakistani and 
Afghan orphans or mentally unstable teenagers recruited from asylums, orphanages, and 
Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Taliban leaders correctly predicted that their sacrifice 
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would create a wave of more capable and dedicated recruits.”270 As a result of Iraqi videos 
justifying suicide attacks and initially employing ‘mentally unstable teenagers’ and 
videotaping them “reading their wills before blowing themselves up,”271 Mullah Dadullah 
“managed to convince a first group of 450 recruits” for his 2006 offensive.272 
A UNAMA report on suicide attacks in Afghanistan argues that “The Taliban are 
likely to have influence in directing ideological worldviews promulgated at pro-Taliban 
madrassas, and they are likely to have sway over specific teachers and administrators to 
encourage children and young adults to consider volunteering” for suicide attacks.273 In 
one his interviews about the Taliban’s coordination and cooperation with the Iraqi 
insurgents, Mullah Dadullah provided the following answers: 
Interviewer: Do you coordinate with them [Iraqi insurgents] in military operations in 
Afghanistan? 
 
Mullah Dadullah: Yes, when we need them, we ask for their help. For example, the 
bombings we carry out — we learned it from them... We learn other types of operations 
from them as well. We have “give and take” relations with the mujahideen of Iraq. We 
cooperate and help each other. 
 
Interviewer: Do you send people for training? For example, do they come here for 
training, or do you maintain contact through the Internet? 
 
Mullah Dadullah: We have training centers here in Afghanistan, and, as you know, they 
have their own centers there. If we discover anything new, they come here to learn it, and 
if they discover anything new, our friends go to learn it from them.274 
 
This is how suicide attacks diffused from Iraq to Afghanistan. Brian Williams in his piece, 
describes in detail the process of diffusion from Iraq to Afghanistan, which he labels the 
“Iraq Effect.”275 To that end, I agree but also emphasize the importance of the other two 
                                                        
270 Rashid, Ahmed. 2008. “Jihadi Suicide Bombers: The New Wave.” New York Review of Books. Vol. 55, 
No 10: pp. 17-22. 
271 Williams, Brian Glyn, 2008, “Mullah Omar's Missiles,” p. 32. 
272 Ibid., p. 34. 
273 UNAMA Report, 2007, Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, p.27. 
274 Williams, Brian Glyn, 2008, “Mullah Omar's Missiles,” p. 33. 
275 Williams, Brian Glyn, 2008, “Mullah Omar's Missiles,” p. 27. 
63 
factors – arms embargo and military pressure – which together with diffusion at one point 
in time make it more likely that insurgents will resort to the use of suicide attacks. 
According to experts: 
… al Qaeda and the Taliban concluded that suicide bombing was more effective than other 
tactics in killing Afghan and coalition forces… Data show that when insurgents fight U.S. 
and coalition forces directly in Afghanistan, there is only a 5 percent probability of 
inflicting casualties. With suicide attacks, the chance of killing people and instilling fear 
increased several fold.276  
 
Thus it seems that the presence of direct links to an external terrorist network in 
combination with arms embargo and military pressure made the Taliban resort to the use 
of suicide attacks in the 2000s in Afghanistan.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Certainly no one has read the mind of Mullah Omar, the elusive leader of the Taliban 
movement, to postulate with 100 percent certainty what made him resort to the use of 
suicide attacks. This, however, should not discourage us from theorizing in search of 
objective reality. With such a spirit, the author initiated this paper to find out why, 
contrary to their predecessors, did the Taliban resort to the use of suicide attacks in the 
2000s in Afghanistan? Although some noble direct and indirect (UNAMA Report 2007; 
Willams fieldwork 2008; Jones 2009) attempts have been made to understand and explain 
this cumbersome puzzle, none of the pieces is systematic and rigorous. Therefore, this 
paper is the first systematic assessment of suicide attacks in Afghanistan, and a country-
specific contribution to existing literature on suicide bombings. 
By drawing from diffusion and innovation literature, the author argued the presence 
of arms embargo, military pressure, and diffusion at one point in time made the Taliban 
resort to the use of suicide attacks. The proposition offered here also explains the dramatic 
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rise in suicide attacks between 2005 and 2006. Although arms embargo was in effect since 
2002, and the Taliban were increasingly under military pressure, diffusion was not present 
until late 2004 to mid 2005. Once the diffusion took effect in mid to late 2005, the 
presence of all three factors at one point in time resulted in a dramatic increase of suicide 
attacks in 2006 in Afghanistan. This is in line with the general argument of this paper that 
suicide attacks are more likely when all three factors are present at one point in time. 
However, it should be noted that data limitation was a big challenge in 
systematically assessing the impact of the three independent variables across time from 
1978 to 2010. There are some time periods that there are no data, and other times where 
there are data available. Therefore, future researchers with access to quantitative data on 
the missing years can better assess the impacts of the three independent variables on the 
occurrence of suicide attacks throughout the period (1978-2010) in Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, since this paper offers a new framework for explaining suicide attacks in the 
context of Afghanistan, future research can employ this framework in other case specific 
contexts or cross-country cases to see whether or not it explains the puzzle. 
Since the findings of this paper suggest that the deadly combination of arms 
embargo, military pressure and diffusion makes it more likely that suicide attacks will 
occur, the author, in line with Michael Horowitz and Philip Potter (2013),277 suggest that 
policy circles should focus their attention to the linkages between the insurgent groups 
rather than treating them as isolated. Therefore, the best time to stop the manifestation of 
suicide attacks is to target insurgent groups links to external terrorist network prior to the 
transfer of suicide attacks’ know-how. Once the insurgents acquire the knowledge, the 
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more they are pressured through arms embargo and/or military pressure, the more likely 
the insurgents would unfortunately employ suicide attacks to overcome the battlefield 
power asymmetry. 
While it seems impossible to eradicate this phenomenon altogether, especially 
when the three factors— arms embargo, military pressure and diffusion—are present, 
attempts should be made to at least avoid the mistakes that increase the pool of volunteers 
for the insurgent groups. For the time being, that is the only thing I suppose we can do. 
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